Inferential Expectations by Gordon Menzies & Daniel John Zizzo
 
 
QUANTITATIVE FINANCE RESEARCH CENTRE 
 
 





Inferential Expectations  
 
 

















University of Technology, Sydney 




University of East Anglia 
 







We propose that the formation of beliefs be treated as statistical hypothesis tests, 
and we label such beliefs inferential expectations. If a belief is overturned through 
the build-up of evidence, agents are assumed to switch to the rational expectation. 
Rational expectations are shown to be a special (limiting) case of inferential 
expectations, with the test size α becoming a metric for rationality. When 
inferential expectations are built into a Dornbusch-style model of the exchange 
rate, regression tests of Uncovered Interest Parity and the rational expectations 
version of the term structure both display downward bias in the slope coefficient.  
We present the results of an experiment that supports inferential expectations.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Rational Expectations (RE) applies the principle of rational behaviour to the acquisition and 
processing of information and to the formation of expectations (Maddock and Carter, 1982). 
That is, economic modellers and policy-makers who use RE as a working hypothesis bestow 
upon their representative agents the ability to calculate mathematical expectations, and, when 
information is limited, to calculate unbiased and efficient parameter estimators.
3  
 
This theory has had a central role in macroeconomics since the 1970s. It has been used to 
model phenomena as diverse as aggregate supply, exchange rates, consumption and economic 
cycles (Lucas, 1972; Dornbusch, 1976; Hall, 1978; Kydland and Prescott, 1982).
4  Important 
empirical predictions about exchange rates (Frankel and Rose, 1995) and the term structure of 
interest rates (Mankiw and Miron, 1986), employ RE as one of their key assumptions. 
 
Despite its influence, the number of alleged empirical failures of RE has built up over the 
passage of time. In experimental settings, RE predictions are not rejected as null hypotheses 
in some contexts (see Dwyer et al., 1993), but the most common outcome is that individuals 
do not hold RE (e.g., Schmalensee, 1976; Blomqvist, 1989; Camerer, 1995; Beckman and 
Downs, 1997; Swenson, 1997). In addition, experimental research often finds either under-
utilization or over-utilization of priors (Camerer, 1995). 
 
One way to meet these criticisms is to build models where agents possess RE in financial 
markets, while allowing sluggish price adjustment elsewhere.  As an approach, this is both 
simple and tractable, as the ‘overshooting’ exchange rate model of Dornbusch (1976) 
demonstrated.  However, participants in financial markets have been forced to reveal frequent 
valuations of foreign exchange and securities for decades, and empirical tests for RE have not 
fared well.     
 
Two tests in particular have proved troublesome. Under the joint hypotheses of RE, risk 
neutrality and zero transaction costs, the slope coefficients in a regression test of Uncovered 
Interest Parity (UIP) and the RE version of the term structure should both be unity:
5   
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Typically, the estimated coefficient in the UIP regression, (1), is less than unity, and 
sometimes it is even negative (Frankel and Rose, 1995). Evidence based on (2) has not been 
as damning, but RE remains a seriously contested hypothesis. For example in a study of 3-, 6- 
and 12-month euro-rates for 17 countries, Gerlach and Smets (1997) found the 76 per cent of 
regression coefficients were less than unity.  
 
                                                 
3 The name RE emphasizes the use of mathematical expectations. But any realistic theory of ‘rational’ belief 
formation must take account of parameter estimation. 
4 RE is also standard in many New Keynesian models (e.g., Woodford, 1991).   
5 The variables s, i-i* and r represent the nominal exchange rate, the short interest differential and the long (here 
two-period) interest rate. Equation (1) can be run with long interest rates, or run in real terms.  Both (1) and (2) 
are sometimes constructed with a constant term.     3
FIGURE 1. SLOPE COEFFICIENTS FOR RE VERSION OF THE TERM STRUCTURE TESTS 





















Source: Table 1 in Gerlach and Smets (1997) 
 
Notes: The histogram pools together the slope coefficients of regression of the change in short rates on the 
interest differential. The regressions have a different form from (2) for 3- 6- and 12-month securities, but under 
RE they should all be unity. Individually, the sample means of the coefficients for each maturity are significantly 
lower than unity with a maximum p-value of 0.03. The country list comprised European economies, plus 
Canada, Japan and the US. 
 
One response by macroeconomists is to note that these regressions are testing joint 
hypotheses. For example, Gerlach and Smets argue that the addition of a time-varying risk 
premium can rescue RE. Granted the existence of such a premium, they argue along the lines 
of Mankiw and Miron (1986) that “it is easier to reject the expectations hypothesis in periods 
in which short-term rates are difficult to predict” (Gerlach and Smets, 1997, pg. 306).
6  
Attempts to explain the failure of UIP using a time-varying risk premium have run up against 
survey evidence which speaks strongly against RE (see Frankel and Froot, 1987). 
 
In this paper we propose a simple alternative to RE which is consistent with the above 
regression results, and for which we can offer some experimental evidence. While we cannot 
rule out the possibility of time-varying risk premia, our approach is to explain the failure of 
these regressions using the notion of belief conservatism. 
 
Formally, we suggest that belief formation be treated as a Neyman-Pearson hypothesis test, 
dubbed  inferential expectations (IE). We assume that when a belief is overturned agents 
switch to RE. Thus, RE is thus a special case of IE if agents are unconcerned about 
mistakenly changing their beliefs (the test size α equals unity), or if there is so much 
information available about a parameter that it is known with certainty (the sampling 
distribution of the estimator collapses to a point at the limit) leading to the rejection of any 
incorrect null. 
 
The intuition of IE is that economic agents hold beliefs that are subject to falsification by new 
information, in much the same way that they are in conventional statistical hypothesis testing. 
                                                 
6 However, Kool and Thornton (2004) raise the importance of outliers for Mankiw and Miron’s conclusions.     4
In particular, a change in beliefs requires new information that exceeds a threshold, modelled 
here by statistical significance. Neyman-Pearson hypothesis tests can be postulated to operate 
as ‘fast and frugal’ heuristics (in the style of Gigerenzer et al., 1999) held by near-rational 
agents.  
 
Thus we assert that beliefs about economic variables tend to be more subject to periods of 
inertia interspersed with occasional discrete shifts than what would be implied by RE. A key 
implication is that agents do not fully process new information every period - possibly 
because they underweight its value and possibly because they do not pay enough conscious 
attention to it -, even if they fully use information occasionally. IE therefore has much in 
common with other models of sluggish belief adjustment (Mankiw and Reis, 2002, 2003).  
 
The alleged reluctance to change one’s mind despite some contrary evidence is not a new idea 
in the philosophy of science (Kuhn, 1970), and it has recently gained some acceptance in 
behavioural macroeconomic where “herding and procrastination help explain the significant 
departures of real-world economies from the competitive general-equilibrium model” 
(Akerlof, 2002, pg. 428, our italics). Indeed, IE is built into the methodology of any social 
science that uses classical hypotheses tests as decisive evidence for changing beliefs.     
Whenever an academic economist uses a test to convince a colleague about the truth of a 
proposition, she implies that the belief in question will not be altered until probability values 
such as 0.05 or 0.01 are attained.
7 Thus, IE potentially explains temporary deviations from 
strict rationality while still imposing a plausible and simple structure on expectations which is 
consistent with economists’ own practices in statistical data analysis.
8 
 
We also present the results from a simple experimental environment where IE outperforms 
RE.  Agents are asked to repeatedly declare the probability that a randomly chosen urn is of a 
particular kind, based on successive draws of balls from the chosen urn. An observed 
phenomenon that is explicable under IE (but not RE) is that agents sometimes do not change 
their declared probabilities in spite of receiving new information. 
 
Our work is perhaps closest in spirit to Goldberg and Frydman (1996) and Frydman and 
Goldberg (2003), who allow agents to conduct hypothesis tests over models.
9 Their research 
program, tracing its roots back at least to an informal discussion by Rappaport (1985), allows 
for departures from rational beliefs, though it is more radical than the temporary departures 
envisaged in this paper. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we explain the theory underlying IE and 
describe a Dornbusch-style model with IE. In section 3 we prove that regressions (1) and (2) 
will have downward-biased coefficients. Section 4 provides the experimental evidence for IE.  
Section 5 concludes. 
 
                                                 
7 Hypothesis tests are used despite the availability of an alternative approach based on Bayesian inference (e.g., 
Zellner, 1988). We do not wish to imply that economic theorizing relies exclusively, or even primarily, on 
statistical hypothesis tests. Nevertheless, one author received criticism from a referee in a top-tier journal 
because significance was accorded to a test with a p-value of 0.052.   
8 It is also consistent with modelling practice in the Markov Switching literature, where passing a threshold, 
however tentatively, leads to a new regime (Hamilton, 1989).   
9 Our work can also be seen as related to Foster and Peyton Young’s (2003) game-theoretical work on 
hypothesis testing by bounded-rational agents on their opponents’ repeated games strategies.     5
2. Inferential Expectations and Exchange Rate Determination 
 
In all IE models, there is a cognitive target. This is a set of state variables or parameters that 
are believed to be in one of two states, described by the null hypothesis H0 and the alternative 
hypothesis H1.
10 There is also a signal which is a model variable that provides information 
about the cognitive target. Finally there is a test statistic and a rejection region that are 
defined conventionally. 
 
Formally, let x be a vector of parameters or random variables that are part of a data-generating 
process for a random variable p. Granted some economic significance to x, agents form 
beliefs about it, based on n stochastic signals pi  (for i = 1, …, n).  
 
The rational expectation is the mathematically best guess for x.  The inferential expectation is 
the mathematically best guess for x, subject to conservatism about changing beliefs (made 
operational by a Neyman-Pearson hypothesis test of size α), and incorporating any testing 
shortcuts that qualify as a ‘fast and frugal’ heuristic. When the concern about changing beliefs 
becomes vanishingly small (α → 1), IE and RE coincide.
11 The cognitive target is x, the 
signal pi, the test statistic some function of the pi’s, and the rejection region are the values of 
the test statistic that lead to a rejection of a Neyman-Pearson hypothesis test of size α. 
  
Under the assumption of IE, there is first ‘under-use’ of marginal pieces of information (by 
comparison with RE) and then ‘over-use’ (when beliefs change). As indicated in the 
introduction, RE is nested in IE when:  
 
1.  α equals unity. This is clear from the fact that α equals unity implies a rejection for any 
value of the test statistic. That being so, the RE belief is constantly embraced.   
 
2.  x is a single parameter and n equals infinity (and memory is unbounded). If the pi’s are 
combined in an estimator for x whose sampling distribution variance is decreasing in n, the 
estimator collapses to a single point at the true value. All nulls will be overturned (except if 
the null is correct), and RE beliefs embraced. 
 
To provide a macroeconomic context, consider a model in the spirit of Dornbusch (1976):  
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10 In many applications, it will be a single variable or parameter. 
11 This is true regardless of any shortcuts used in the testing procedure. If the test size is unity, then hypothesis 
testing is suspended (along with any shortcuts about distributional assumptions, etc.) because a Neyman-Pearson 
hypothesis test minimizes the size of the probability of a type II error given the test size (probability of a type I 
error). That is, given a test size of unity, the best way to minimize the chance of falsely believing the null is to 
always reject it.   6
All variables are in logs, except the nominal short and long (two-period) interest rate, 
respectively it and rt. All parameters are positive. Time zero is divided into pre-money-shock 
0
- and post-money-shock 0
+; afterwards, t = 1, 2, 3,……∞. The exchange rate, money, prices 
(domestic and foreign), output and foreign interest rates are s, m, p, p*,  y  and i*. The latter 
three variables, and m0-, are normalized to zero. Two steady states occur; one prior to a 
money shock (at 0
-) and the one after the shock has completely dissipated (at ∞). A monetary 
contraction ∆m (<0) occurs at time 0
+ and is sustained forever. The pre-shock m of 0 implies a 
steady state of p0- = 0 and s0- = 0 (the latter from purchasing power parity). Equation (3) can 
be either an LM curve or a quasi-Taylor rule. For the latter, it is re-expressed with i as the 
subject and m as the nominal income target.
12 The standard Dornbusch assumption of sticky 
prices is adopted.   
 
The standard Dornbusch solution assumes RE. That is, E(st+1)=st+1 and E(it+1)=it+1. The 
eigenvalue of the system is (1-Bp), and the solution from t=0
+ is given below (derivations in 
Appendix A).   
 
) 9 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
) 8 ( ) 1 (
) 7 ( ) 1 (










































The IE solution requires a plausible null belief. We assume that this is the belief that the 
central bank is engaging in a managed float, and that the initial steady-state exchange rate 
(s0- = 0) is its target level of the currency.
13 Until enough evidence builds up, agents believe 
that next period the central bank will defend the currency by driving the log-exchange rate 
back to zero, and keep it there forever.
14 Appendix A shows how this outcome could be 
achieved by driving i to zero next period, and keeping it there forever. To parameterize the IE 
hypothesis test, we assume that agents are making inference about the future values of s based 
on the latest time series observation on p.
15  
 
Formally, the inference procedure has to decide between: 
 
H0: st+j = 0, j > 0 (implying it+j  = 0 j > 0). 
H1: A standard Dornbusch money contraction will be sustained; mt+ j=∆m j > 0. 
 
                                                 
12 The model has a block recursive structure, which we will exploit to obtain analytic solutions under IE.  A 
money shock drives p and i, via (long run) purchasing power parity, the quasi-Taylor rule, and the partial 
adjustment process for prices.  Then, s and r are determined by (5) and (6).  Purchasing power parity implies 
s+p*-p = 0.   
13 This target can only be met by setting the appropriate level of interest rates, and departures from the target are 
possible. Therefore, the institutional setup of the model is a managed float (rather than a fixed rate regime) 
where the instrument is the interest rate (rather than foreign exchange intervention).    
14 Or naive agents could view recent moves in i and s as ‘turbulence’, which will vanish next period. 
15 Other signals are possible. Agents could stop believing the bank when non-zero interest rates persist.     7
Interpreting (3) as a quasi-Taylor rule, H0 implies the central bank is permitting a temporary 
change in the price level,
16 while H1 implies a permanent accommodation to a changed price 
level. In the latter case, the solution to the model is given by (7) to (9). Under H1, the steady 
state level of p and e would both be ∆m, from t=∞ in (7) and (9), consistently with purchasing 
power parity. 
 
One possible interpretation of this analysis is that IE tells a story of the central bank having to 
give away a currency target, when the credibility strain becomes too great.
17 In this 
interpretation, the shock to m represents the implementation of policy that puts long-run 
purchasing power parity and the central bank exchange rate target at odds with one another.   
 
In the Dornbusch model, this would be recognized immediately, and the central bank would 
be ignored. RE agents work out the implied price level from the shock, and use purchasing 
power parity to calculate the implied long-run exchange rate. They then solve backwards 
using forecast interest differentials, forcing the current exchange rate to ‘jump’ once to its 
‘overshooting’ value. In IE, the story is more subtle: IE agents initially believe that the central 
bank will defend the currency from next period. To solve for the exchange rate, they note that 
the long-run exchange rate will be zero and that all future interest differentials must be too 
(see Appendix A). Therefore, the current exchange rate does not have the long-run shock built 
in, nor does it account for future domestic returns. Initially it ‘jumps’, but only by the 
magnitude of the current (non-zero) interest differential (see (11)), since this is the only 
influence that IE agents recognize. Later on, when agents become disillusioned with the 
central bank, they factor in future returns and the shock to the long run, and the exchange rate 
jumps again, this time to attain the RE solution.   
 
A rejection region and test statistic that is consistent with our parameterization of IE would 
be:  
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where α is the test size.
18 If α = 0, the null will never be overturned, as would be the case in 
any hypothesis test. If α = 1 the null will never be believed, and the model reverts to the RE 
solution, as required by IE.
19 At a 0.05 significance level agents believe that s and i will revert 
to their initial values (0) in subsequent periods, until prices have changed by 95 per cent of 
what is implied under H1.   
 
                                                 
16 H0 implies steady-state s is zero, purchasing power parity therefore implies that steady-state p is likewise zero.  
17 In our stylized shock, the central bank is fighting against an appreciation, while it pursues a deflationary 
policy. Naturally, it is possible to reverse the shock, so that the central bank is fighting against a depreciation 
while pursuing inflationary policy. However, to avoid negative nominal interest rates (a problem generally 
ignored in Dornbusch formulations) the i*=0 normalization would have to be dropped, creating less transparent 
algebra.   
18 More generally, the weight in the weighted-average would be φ(α) and 1-φ(α), where φ(α) has the property 
that φ(1) = 1 and φ(0) = 0. 
19 The second case where IE becomes RE (infinite sample size and unbounded memory) is not relevant if the test 
is based only on the most recent p (n is unity), as here. It would be possible to define a test statistic using a 
combination of the p’s (n>1) such that the sampling distribution variance was decreasing in n. Time intervals 
could also be defined over progressively smaller increments, so that as n→∞ the null would be rejected 
immediately, ushering in the second case in the limit.   8
Thus, the cognitive target in this model is the set of all future exchange rates, the signal is p, 
the test statistic at time t is the most recent price level pt and the rejection region is given 
by (10). 
 
It remains for us to specify the time path for s and r under H0, which alters the model by 
violating E(st+1)=st+1 and E(it+1)=it+1. Under H0, s and i are forecast to revert to the original 
steady state next period, so that E(st+1)=E(it+1)=0.  That being so, the actual evolution of i and 
p – which are not affected by expectations – are as before, while the solutions for s and r until 
H0 is rejected come from (5) and (6) with E(st+1)=E(it+1)=0.   
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When H0 is rejected, the exchange rate jumps to the Dornbusch path. This can be illustrated 
with the standard diagram. 
 
FIGURE 2. DORNBUSCH SETUP WITH RE AND IE 
(Under H1 Left & Right Panels Identical) 
  RE       IE  
   
  m o n e y        money 
     0
-    0
+               t              H0     H1               t 
 
        
  prices       prices 
 
    
  interest  rate      interest rate 
 
                                                                                
    exchange rate              exchange rate 
                           H0:  s = -i          
  
  
            H1: s = RE(s)   9
 
Notes: The left-hand panel shows the standard dynamics from Dornbusch (1976) for a monetary contraction. The 
right-hand panel show the IE dynamics. Prior to H0 being overturned, agents in the foreign exchange market 
ignore future (positive) interest rate differentials, and the appreciated (lower) transversality condition for the 
exchange rate. When H0 is discarded for H1 (as the shaded region is entered) the exchange rate jumps to the RE 
solution.   
 
Importantly, IE has the capacity to deliver a sudden, and potentially large, change in a model 
variable – here the exchange rate – for a small increment of information, at the instant H0 is 
rejected.   
 
We now turn to two implications of IE in this model. 
 
3 Downward Bias in OLS Regressions 
 
We now show that data on s and r generated by this model with IE will, when placed in the 
OLS regressions (1) and (2), create downward bias in the parameters.   
 
Theorem 1: If H0 is believed for at least one period, the OLS coefficient from a regression of 
∆st+1 on it will be less than unity. 
 
Proof: Let t* be the time period in which H0 is overturned. The numerator of the OLS 
coefficient can be decomposed into three terms; the cross product summed prior to, at, and 
after t*-1.  
 












































We evaluate each quantity in the numerator separately. 
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Parenthetically, this establishes Theorem 1 for the special case of α = 0.  Agents never switch 
from H0 and an OLS regression of ∆s on i will fit perfectly, with a coefficient Bp, which is 
assumed less than unity (see (4)).  
  
The middle term of the numerator in (13) involves a change in the exchange rate as it jumps 
from the H0 path at time t*-1 to the H1 path at time t*. (See the bottom of right-hand panel in 
Figure 2.) The H1 value of the exchange rate is given by a combination of (8) and (9), and 
reflects a realization that the terminal value for the exchange rate has jumped down by ∆m.     10

















































































Since Bp is no larger than unity, 2-1/Bp can never exceed unity. Since ∆m is negative, the 
bracketed term on the RHS must always be less than unity.  
The last term on the numerator of (13) is evaluated under H1 so that (5) holds, with 














t t i i s  
 
Collecting the three parts, the OLS numerator is a weighted average of i
2, with weights prior 
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Apart from the trivial case where H0 is never believed (wt=1 always), the OLS coefficient 
must be strictly less than unity.  Q.E.D. 
 
Lemma 1: One of the weights in the OLS numerator can be negative. 
 
Proof: For small values of Bp, noting that 
  
1
1 ) 1 /( / ) 1 )( (
−
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the weight applied to i
 2
t*-1 on the numerator of the OLS coefficient could be negative.  This 
raises the possibility that the numerator, and therefore the whole estimate, could be negative.  
Q.E.D.   
 
The intuition of Theorem 1 has already been outlined. Agents are not factoring in the altered 
steady-state purchasing power parity value of the exchange rate, which restrains the 
appreciation, compared with the RE solution under H1. Furthermore, from (14), the future 
change in the exchange rate is muted by a factor Bp compared with the H1 solution, reflecting 
a failure to factor in the future returns available from holding the domestic currency. In other   11
words, the coefficient is biased down partly because the H0 expectation of interest rates (zero 
for every future period) makes agents too pessimistic about returns, and partly because the 
jump appreciation (fall in s) between the H0 and H1 exchange rate paths occurs while the 
actual interest differential is positive. If the latter jump is large enough, it can make the 
coefficient negative, as implied by Lemma 1. 
 
We conclude the section on UIP by noting that the regression (1) is often run with a constant 
term. Simulations confirm that the slope coefficient remains sensitive to the deep parameter 
Bp, and that a negative   obtains when B β ˆ
p is low. High values of α tend to magnify (15), 
making the coefficient negative, as the jump between paths occurs when it*-1 is high.
20  
 
TABLE 1– UNCOVERED INTEREST RATE REGRESSIONS WITH CONSTANT: 
MEAN SLOPE COEFFICIENT VALUES CLASSIFIED BY α AND βp 
  α
βp 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.1 0.196 0.166 0.087 -0.042 -0.23 -0.435 -0.74 -0.946 -1.198 -1.885
(0.111) (0.171) (0.27) (0.38) (0.497) (0.596) (0.715) (0.783) (0.856) (1.019)
0.2 0.225 0.204 0.148 0.061 -0.014 -0.125 -0.29 -0.538 -0.913 -0.913
(0.089) (0.112) (0.157) (0.208) (0.243) (0.285) (0.337) (0.397) (0.465) (0.465)
0.3 0.314 0.289 0.224 0.156 0.037 -0.179 -0.179 -0.578 -0.578 -0.578
(0.086) (0.101) (0.132) (0.157) (0.191) (0.235) (0.235) (0.285) (0.285) (0.285)
0.4 0.399 0.375 0.331 0.244 0.06 0.06 -0.351 -0.351 -0.351 -0.351
(0.09) (0.098) (0.11) (0.13) (0.159) (0.159) (0.187) (0.187) (0.187) (0.187)
0.5 0.5 0.471 0.406 0.25 0.25 -0.165 -0.165 -0.165 -0.165 -0.165
(0.089) (0.094) (0.104) (0.12) (0.12) (0.125) (0.125) (0.125) (0.125) (0.125)
0.6 0.595 0.547 0.415 0.415 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.09) (0.094) (0.101) (0.101) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081)
0.7 0.678 0.568 0.568 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143
(0.092) (0.094) (0.094) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
0.8 0.718 0.718 0.274 0.274 0.274 0.274 0.274 0.274 0.274 0.274
(0.092) (0.092) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
0.9 0.867 0.393 0.393 0.393 0.393 0.393 0.393 0.393 0.393 0.393












Notes: The table reports mean slope coefficients (and mean standard errors in parenthesis) across simulations 
with different values of βi. 
 
We now turn to (2), the term structure regression.   
 
Theorem 2: If H0 is believed for at least one period, the OLS coefficient from a regression of 
∆it+1 on rt -it will be biased downwards (strictly less than unity). 
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20 Appendix B describes the simulations.   12
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The OLS estimator is relatively simple to calculate, because the only variable involving a 
future change (∆it+1) is unaffected by expectations, and so does not involve a complex jump 
between paths at the switch between H0 and H1 (as s did in (1)).  Thus we can partition the 
sums into the terms where the respective hypotheses hold.    
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Clearly, a negative γˆ is impossible. As was the case for the UIP regression, (2) is often run 
with a constant term. As reviewed in Appendix B, simulations confirm that the slope 
coefficient remains sensitive to the deep parameter Bp but the value of the slope coefficient is 
relatively robust to different values of α. 
TABLE 2: TERM STRUCTURE REGRESSIONS WITH CONSTANT: 
MEAN SLOPE COEFFICIENT VALUES CLASSIFIED BY α AND βp 
  α
βp 0 . 0 5 0 . 10 . 20 . 30 . 40 . 50 . 60 . 70 . 80 . 9
0.1 0.099 0.094 0.088 0.084 0.081 0.080 0.079 0.079 0.080 0.091
(0) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.016)
0.2 0.197 0.195 0.192 0.190 0.190 0.190 0.191 0.197 0.220 0.220
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.011) (0.015) (0.022) (0.022)
0.3 0.298 0.297 0.295 0.295 0.297 0.304 0.304 0.334 0.334 0.334
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
0.4 0.399 0.398 0.398 0.398 0.405 0.405 0.435 0.435 0.435 0.435
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.011) (0.011) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
0.5 0.499 0.499 0.499 0.503 0.503 0.529 0.529 0.529 0.529 0.529
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
0.6 0.600 0.599 0.601 0.601 0.620 0.620 0.620 0.620 0.620 0.620
(0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
0.7 0.700 0.700 0.700 0.711 0.711 0.711 0.711 0.711 0.711 0.711
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
0.8 0.800 0.800 0.804 0.804 0.804 0.804 0.804 0.804 0.804 0.804
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
0.9 0.900 0.900 0.900 0.900 0.900 0.900 0.900 0.900 0.900 0.900
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Notes: The table reports mean slope coefficients (and mean standard errors in parenthesis) across simulations 
with different values of βi. 
 
We conclude this section by noting that our model connects interest-rate forecast errors and 
coefficient bias.  Under the null, agents make errors in forecasting future interest differentials, 
since they incorrectly believe them to be zero. Thus, the downward bias in the expectation 
hypothesis and UIP coefficients is consistent with agents making interest-rate forecast errors 
(Mankiw and Miron, 1986, and Gourinchas and Tornell, 2004).
21   
 
5 Inferential Expectations and Experimental Evidence 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In this section we briefly describe an individual choice experiment designed to test whether IE 
has significantly greater explanatory power than RE or, to put it differently, whether there are 
subjects for which assuming that α < 1 provides a better fit.
22 The individual choice design is 
best suited to test the idea of IE in its cleanest form, i.e. without having to worry about the 
strategic considerations that would arise from a strategic or market setting. As discussed in the 
introduction, the design is also meant to capture beliefs conservatism in a simple way: we 
predict that, contrary to RE, agents sometimes do not change beliefs in response to new 
information. 
 
There were two urns reflecting two possible states of the worlds, namely different 
combinations of white and orange balls. The true state of the world was chosen randomly, and 
subjects received signals about its nature by the means of random ball draws with replacement 
from the ‘chosen urn’. The prior probability of an urn being chosen was 0.5 at the start of the 
experiment, but should have then evolved differently according to the observed sequence of 
white and orange balls being drawn and, importantly, according to different models of 
expectation formation. We next describe the experimental design in more detail, and then 
move to the experimental predictions and results. 
 
5.2 Experimental Design 
The experiment was run in at the School of Finance and Economics, University of 
Technology Sydney, in September 2003.
23 Recruitment was through lecture announcements, 
posters, and UTS Online (a local forum for electronic notices). Recruits were predominantly, 
though not exclusively, undergraduate students. There were six experimental sessions, three 
for each of the two experimental conditions; all sessions had six subjects except the last one, 
which had seven, for a total of 37 subjects. The experiment lasted about two hours, and paid 
an average of 31.42 Australian dollars ($A).
24 The experiment was in two stages, structurally 
                                                 
21 We leave the strength and direction of this relationship for future research, depending as it does on the choice 
of a fairly stylized null and alternative hypothesis. For the regression without a constant term (17), the slope is 
increasing in α. A higher test size reduces the time H0 prevails and therefore reduces the interest-rate sums over 
H0. Thus, a better interest-rate forecasting performance (a higher α) increases the coefficient (consistently with 
Mankiw and Miron, 1986). Appendix A proves that the IE profile of interest rate expectations – namely E(it+1)=0 
up until the null is overturned – can be consistent with the estimated persistence of interest rate predictions for 
reasonable parameters (as in Gourinchas and Tornell, 2004). 
22 For space constraints, we focus only on IE as alternative to RE in this paper. Menzies and Zizzo (2003) also 
consider two adaptive expectations algorithms, and we plan to consider one or two other algorithms in additional 
research. None of the algorithms we are aware of, however, can explain the key ‘no switch’ finding discussed in 
this section.  
23 It was approved by the UTS Ethics Committee. The experimental instructions can be found in Appendix C. 
24 This was roughly equal to 25 US dollars.   14
unrelated to one another; in this paper we focus only on the first stage, which had six periods 
of fifteen rounds each and took over 75% of the session time.  
 
At the start of the session subjects faced a table on the top of which there were two identical 
urns, a set of white and orange balls in a basket, and a screen. In the 0.7 condition, the 
experimenter (a) showed subjects that both urns were empty, (b) in front of the subjects, he 
took seven white balls and three orange balls and placed them in one of the two urns (Urn 1 in 
what follows) (c) and he took three white balls and seven orange balls and placed them in the 
other urn (Urn 2 in what follows); (d) he then hid both urns behind the screen. The 0.6 
condition was identical to the 0.7 condition, except that Urn 1 got six white balls and four 
orange balls, and Urn 2 got four white balls and six orange balls. 
 
At the start of each period subjects were reminded about the period number and then one of 
the two urns was randomly chosen by the flip of a coin in front of the subjects, and put on 
display. Let us label this urn the ‘chosen urn’. It was made clear to the subjects that the 
probability of Urn 1 being chosen was 50% at the start of each period, but they were not told 
which urn had actually been chosen.  
 
At the start of each round the experimenter drew a ball from the chosen urn, showed it to the 
subjects and then put it back in; subjects were asked to write down the ball color in 
correspondence to the correct period and round in their answer booklet, and then had to make 
a probability guess, between 0% and 100%, on how likely it was that the chosen urn was 
Urn 1. Subjects were told not to change choices made in previous rounds.
25 
 
Once a period was completed, the following period got started with a new flip of the coin, up 
to the end of the 6
th period. It was made clear to the subjects that the probability an urn was 




Payment was based on the guess made in a randomly chosen period and round picked at the 
end of the experiment. A standard quadratic scoring rule (e.g., Davis and Holt, 1993) was 
used in relation to this round to penalise incorrect answers: if the chosen urn was Urn 1, then 
subjects got 25 - 25 × ( guess  - 1)
2 $A; if the chosen urn was Urn 2, then subject got 
25 - 25 × guess
2 $A. Subjects were provided with a payment table detailing the payment for 
each level of error, without need of any computation on their part (see Appendix C). There 
was also a participation fee of 8 $A. 
 
5.3 Experimental Predictions 
 
Rational Expectations. The prior probability was set at 0.5. As information flowed in, RE (or, 
equivalently, IE with α = 1) predicted straightforward Bayesian updating depending on 
whether white or orange balls were drawn.  
 
Inferential Expectations. The IE signal, say si, is the drawn ball so that si = 1 for a white ball 
and 0 for an orange ball.
27  The cognitive target is the probability that the chosen urn is Urn 1, 
                                                 
25 We shall return to this point towards the end of section 5.3. 
26 A questionnaire administered to the subjects at the start of the experiment ensured that this, and other key 
points, were clear. The experimenters gave clarifications to the subjects who got answers wrong on the 
questionnaire. 
27 Naturally, this terminology is unrelated to the Dornbusch model, where s was the exchange rate.     15
or, relatedly, the total probability of drawing a white ball, given the beliefs about the chosen 
urn, denoted pw.
28 It is simpler to describe the test with the second cognitive target (the total 
probability of a white ball), since the test statistic becomes the sample proportion of ones,  . 
With both urns equally likely at the start, the original null is that the total probability of a 
white ball is 0.5.
i s ˆ
29 The appropriate test here is a two-sided test, and we assume that agents use 
one of two alternative shortcuts to determine the rejection region. The first method, the 
Normal approximation method,
30  requires agents to maintain the belief corresponding to the 
null hypothesis until signal i is received such that: 
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where z is a standardized random variable (the distance from the mean in units of standard 
deviations), and the weak inequality is relevant for a discrete random variable. If the 
probability of getting an observation more than k standard deviations away from the mean is 
less than 1/k
2, we may set 1/k
2 equal to α, and make a rare event statement.
32 
 
The main advantage of employing Chebyshev’s inequality is that it only requires the 
computation of mean and variance, sidestepping the need for distributional assumptions, 





















Both shortcuts can be considered as consistent with a view of IE as a fast and frugal heuristic. 
In what follows we label IEN the predictions of IE complemented with Normal approximation 
and IEC the predictions of IE complemented with Chebyshev’s inequality. In both cases we 
estimate the value of α corresponding to each experimental subject by using a least squares 
method, i.e. by minimizing the sum of squared errors between predictions and observations. 
That is, we consider all the choices made across rounds and periods by each subject (90 in the 
                                                 
28 There is a one-to-one correspondence between the two. For the 0.7 condition, pw = 0.7 P(Urn1) + 0.3 P(Urn2) 
= 0.7 P(Urn1) + 0.3 [1 - P(Urn1)]. A similar expression holds for the 0.6 condition.   
29 For the 0.7 condition, 0.7 × 0.5 + 0.3 × 0.5 = 0.5, and 0.6 × 0.5 + 0.4 × 0.5 = 0.5 for the 0.6 condition.   
30 Naturally, once the Central Limit Theorem holds this is not a shortcut. 
31 On Chebyshev’s inequality, see for example Davidson and MacKinnon (1993). 
32 For example, suppose a test of size α = 0.25 is required.  The above inequality says that the chance of getting 
an observation more than 2 standard deviations away from the mean is less than 25%. Therefore, if such an 
observation is observed, a rare event has occurred and the belief can be changed with a chance of making a 
mistake (probability of a type I error) no greater than 25%.   16
full sample) and we find the subject-specific value of α that minimizes the sum of squared 
differences between IE (IEC or IEN) and such choices.
33 
 
Experimental Hypothesis.  We can compute the expectations profile for RE, IEN, and IEC 
agents in relation to each session, using the sequence of observed ball draws and the 
procedures described so far. 
HYPOTHESIS 1. IEN and IEC have lower mean square errors from empirically observed choices 
than RE. 
HYPOTHESIS 2. IEN and IEC are better able to predict belief conservatism than RE. 
Appendix E presents two additional hypotheses designed to test the robustness of IE. In 
testing Hypothesis 1 and 2 we used not only the ‘full’ sample from all six periods but also an 
‘experienced’ sample which removes the observations from periods 1 and 2, thus allowing 
subjects to get some practice and experience about the nature of the task. We also considered 
a ‘restricted’ sample of observations where periods in which subjects altered their choices 
(notwithstanding our instructions to the contrary), and periods where some misperceptions 
occurred in the recording of the colour of the balls, were removed.
34 Overall, we employed 
four samples: the full sample, the experienced sample, the restricted sample, and the 
experienced restricted sample. 
 
5.4 Experimental Results 
 
Estimation of α values. Figure 3 provides histograms for the distribution of α for both IEN and 
IEC, in the various samples.  
 
                                                 
33 Or, equivalently, the mean sum of square error computed by observation; see Appendix D (section D.1) for 
details. 
34 A total of nine periods were removed in this way, six from choice alteration and three from apparent 
misperception. Five of the nine periods removed were in periods 1 or 2.   17
FIGURE 3. HISTOGRAMS OF α VALUES FOR IE   18
In the experienced (full) sample mean α values were 0.585 (0.635) for IEN and 0.767 (0.813) 
for IEC; mean values in the corresponding restricted samples were virtually identical (see 
Table 3). Table 4 shows the percentage of subjects displaying α < 1 and α < 0.9 in the various 
samples. 











Full Sample Experienced Sample
Condition Condition
0.6 0.7 0.6 0.7
IEC  0.819 0.808 0.736 0.796
IEN 0.703 0.571 0.597 0.573
Restricted Sample Exp. Restricted Sample
Condition Condition
0.6 0.7 0.6 0.7
IEC  0.82 0.808 0.736 0.796
IEN 0.696 0.571 0.597 0.573
Notes: The table contains the mean of the α values estimated for each subject and sample in relation to IEC and 
IEN, by experimental condition. The hypothesis that the means are the same between conditions (see Appendix 
E) cannot be rejected in Mann-Whitney tests. 
 
TABLE 4 - PERCENTAGE OF SUBJECTS WITH α < 1 OR 0.9 
 
  Sample
Full Exp Restr Exp+Restr
α < 1 IEC 0.297 0.378 0.297 0.378
IEN 0.757 0.784 0.757 0.784
α < 0.9 IEC 0.27 0.351 0.27 0.351







Notes: The table displays the percentages of subjects, out of n = 37, for which α < 1 or α < 0.9. Full: full sample; 
Exp: experienced sample; Restr: restricted sample; Exp+Restr: experienced restricted sample. Percentages are 
computed out of n = 37. 
 
A non-negligible fraction of agents had α < 1 in both cases: for example, in the experienced 
sample, 14 out of 37 subjects (0.378) seems to have employed α < 1 for IEC, a number rising 
to 29 out of 37 (0.757) for IEN. It is interesting to look also at the α < 0.9 fraction of agents, as 
this may remove α estimation cases which are virtually indistinguishable, in terms of 
goodness of fit and predictions, from α = 1. For IEC, all but one of the 11-14 subjects for 
whom α < 1 also have α < 0.9. For IEN, over half of the subjects have α < 0.9. 
 
The clear differences in the distributions of αs between IEN and IEC may suggest that IEN and 
IEC may bear little relation to one another. However, while there were differences in the   19
distributions of the αs, Pearson r (IEN, IEC) is equal to 0.887, 0.843, 0.890 and 0.845 in the 
full, experienced, restricted, and experienced restricted samples respectively
35 (P < 0.001). 
Although IEN values tend to be lower than IEC values, IEN and IEC predictions tend to follow 
each other closely. 
 
Appendix E provides additional results about α estimation. We show that α values are robust 
between conditions and, if estimated on a period-by-period basis, they do not tend to converge 
to 1, i.e. to the RE benchmark. Another way of looking at the data is to constrain α to take 
only one possible value below 1, so as to classify subjects in one of just two categories, RE 
holders and IE (with α < 1) holders. Table 5 illustrates the results of this exercise. 
 





                                                
Sample α %IE
Full IEC 0.27 16.216
IEN 0.05 16.216
Experienced IEC 0.01-0.09 16.22
IEN 0.04 21.621
Restricted IEC 0.27 16.216
IEN 0.05 16.216












Notes: The table displays the estimated value of α if α is allowed to take only one value less than 1, and the 
percentage of subjects for which α < 1 correspondingly applies. In two cases α is expressed as a range since any 
value of α within this range has an equally good fit.  
 
Even under the constraint of only one value α < 1, between 16 and 22% are estimated to have 
IE, and α values are around 0.05 for IEN and for two out of four samples for IEC.
36  
 
Hypothesis 1. We test Hypothesis 1 by computing the mean square error (MSE) values 
between choices and predictions according to each algorithm. One problem in doing so is the 
very likely non-independence of observations made by each subject. To address this problem, 
we use MSE values computed by observation, but only as the basis for a nonparametric sign 
test, with the number of subjects n = 37 as the degrees of freedom.
37 The results of the sign 
tests
38 are illustrated in Table 6.  
(Table 6 appears at the end of the document.) 
IEN outperforms IEC: for example, in the experienced sample, out of 37 subjects IEN 
performed worse than IEC twice, tied for twenty-two subjects, and performed better 14 times 
 
35 Spearman ρ (IEN, IEC) is equal to 0.822, 0.774, 0.831 and 0.775 in the full, experienced, restricted, and 
experienced restricted samples respectively (P < 0.001). 
36 In the rest of this section we use the MSE-minimizing α values, rather than these constrained values.  
37 We perform robustness checks by running sign tests also on MSE values computed by period and on MSE 
values computed by subject. See Appendix D for details.
 
38 We cannot use Wilcoxon tests because Wilcoxon tests rely on the assumption that the sample is drawn from a 
symmetric distribution, assumption which is clearly violated in this case. For results of (also unsatisfactory) F 
tests, see Menzies and Zizzo (2004).   20
(P = 0.007, two-tailed). An electronically available appendix
39 contains the mean choices and 
predictions according to each model of expectation formation by session and period; Figure 4 
exemplifies the kind of aggregate dynamics observed by reproducing the graphs from session 
4 (a 0.7 condition session). 
 





































                                                 
39 The appendix is at http://www.uea.ac.uk/~ec601/MZ/MenziesZizzoWebAppendix.pdf.   21
 
 
Notes: the lines for IEC and IEN overlap in period 1. 
 
In period 1 RE performs better in the first seven rounds, but IE does better on average 
afterwards. In periods 2 and 6, IE may be doing a better job in capturing the lower variability 
of choice relative to RE. In periods 3, 4 and 5 IE clearly does a better job at tracking mean 
choices than RE. Relative to RE, there appears to be a lower mean sensitivity of IE 
(with α < 1) predictions to new information (though exceptions exist). 
 
Hypothesis 2. RE predicts that agents should revise their guesses every round in response to 
new information. This is not the case: Table 7 reports that 35% of the times subjects chose not 
to switch guesses. 
TABLE 7 - NO SWITCH ANALYSIS 
  Full Sample Restricted Sample
Observed 0.354 Observed 0.356
IEC 0.307 IEC 0.307
IEN 0.365 IEN 0.367
ρ(IEC) 0.027 ρ(IEC) 0.096
ρ(IEN) 0.364* ρ(IEN) 0.239°
Experienced Sample Experienced Restricted Sample
Observed 0.354 Observed 0.354
IEC 0.363 IEC 0.346
IEN 0.424 IEN 0.425
ρ(IEC) 0.027 ρ(IEC) -0.19










Notes:  Observed, IEC and IEN are the fractions of not switching choices (i.e., not different from 
previous round in same period) respectively observed or predicted by IEC and IEN. ρ( IEC) and ρ( IEN) 
are the respective Spearman correlation coefficients of the percentage of no switches predicted for 
each subject by IEC and IEN with the observed percentage of no switches.°: significant at the 0.1 level; 
*: significant at the 0.05 level; **: significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
This is very close to the mean predictions of IEN and IEC (with MSE-minimizing α values), 
which depending on the sample chosen range between 30% and 42% (the difference is never 
significant in nonparametric Wilcoxon tests
40). Spearman correlation coefficients between the 
mean amount of ‘no switches’ observed and predicted by IEN and IEC show, however, that, 
while IEN has predictive power, IEC has not. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions  
 
This paper has presented a new model of belief formation. The basic idea of IE is that beliefs 
are maintained or revised using a Neyman-Pearson hypothesis test. They are rejected in 
favour of RE only when the rejection region, determined by the test size α, is reached. The 
                                                 
40 Sign tests yield the same answer.   22
nesting of RE within IE means that the estimated α becomes a metric for the ‘rationality’ – 
the closeness to RE beliefs - of agents.   
 
This fast and frugal heuristic is consistent with the scientific practices of most scientists, and 
with a view of decision-making characterized by information-gathering and 
information-processing costs.  It is also consistent with the view that agents do not pay 
attention all the time to new flows of information, and only when a threshold is reached do 
they pay attention and switch beliefs. Our experimental setup was a fairly hostile one for 
inferential expectations since the only task subjects had to do was to choose probabilities, and 
hence attention is unlikely to have been a serious issue: this may under-estimate the use of 
inferential expectations. Yet, our experimental evidence suggested that between one and two 
thirds of agents exhibited α’s less than 0.9, and that there is significant evidence of belief 
conservatism.  When we constrained α to take only one possible value other than 1, we found 
that for IE complemented by the normal approximation method this value was in the region of 
a 0.05 significance level for around one-fifth of the subjects. 
 
We presented a variant of the Dornbusch (1976) model, and showed that simply replacing RE 
with IE can explain the empirical failures of regressions on uncovered interest parity and on 
the term structure of interest rates. Naturally, these results may be contingent upon the 
specification of the null and alternative hypotheses, the assumption of a common α across all 
agents and the macro-model within which the exchange rate and long interest rate are 
imbedded. Nevertheless, we suggest that our approach may be valuable, since it attributes the 
extent of parameter bias to deep model parameters, rather than risk premia.  
 
We intend to develop IE further, both theoretically and empirically. In future work we hope to 
place IE into full scale macroeconomic models, to see if equations (1) and (2) continue to 
display parameter bias. Inferential expectations could also be relevant for more sophisticated 
hypothesis testing, for example to detect the presence of autocorrelation, as in Rotheli (1998). 
Finally, we have confined our attention to a single change in belief. If continual inference on 
the long-run exchange rate meant repeated changes in beliefs, the variance of the current 
exchange rate would be dominated by ‘shocks’ (really belief changes) to the long-run rate 
(Campbell and Clarida, 1987). The goal of this paper has simply been to define IE, present 
some evidence in favour of it, and demonstrate its potential fruitfulness as a modelling device.   23
APPENDIX A. EXCHANGE RATE MODEL 
 
A.1 DERIVATION OF EQUATIONS (7)-(9) 
 
With the normalizations in the text, the RE system becomes: 
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The steady-state level of prices in (4’) is ∆m from the properties of the system in the steady 
state.  As ∆s=0=i (from (5’)), p=m=∆m (from (3’)).  Furthermore, from purchasing power 
parity (which holds in the steady state) s=p=∆m. We now solve the system.  
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p0+ is zero from the Dornbusch assumption of sticky prices (p0+=p0-). The eigenvalue of the 
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Clearly, it+1=(1-Bp)it . To obtain s, (5’) is iterated forward to infinity (when s=∆m) and the 
infinite GP, with ratio (1-Bp), is summed. 
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A.2 COHERENCE OF BELIEFS ON THE CENTRAL BANK POLICY 
 
This part of the appendix demonstrates that the central bank policy of driving all future 
log-exchange rates to zero (i.e. s = 0) is achievable, even though the price level has already 
changed (for t > 0).  
 
First, by solving (5’) forwards and assuming s∞=0, it is clear that setting all future i to zero 
will force all future s to zero (solving back from the long run). Setting i=0 in the money 
demand equation (3’) requires m=p. How is p determined? Again assuming s∞=0 purchasing 
power parity implies p∞=0. Thus, if steady-state p is zero, equation (4’) becomes 
pt+1=(1-Bp)pt  or pz=pt(1-Bp)
z-t, where z (> t) refers to all future periods from t.   24
 
Thus, IE agents who understand the model and who think that the central bank’s desired 
log-exchange rate is zero (including, crucially, s∞=0) will believe, coherently with these 
beliefs, that at period t+1 the money stock (or the nominal income target if (3’) is a Taylor 
rule) will jump back to pt+1=pt(1-Bp) so that interest rates will be zero (since m-p will be 
zero); and that, from t+1 forward, m will equal p and both will converge to zero at rate (1-Bp). 
 
Such a policy implies that the central bank is permitting only a temporary change to the price 
level (p∞=0 as noted in the text), and that all future interest differentials are zero (as noted in 
the statement of H0). 
 
 
A.3 INTEREST RATE FORECASTING 
 
It was asserted in the text that, under IE, a regression of the expectation of it+1 (at time t) on 
current it (without a constant term) can yield a high autocorrelation parameter for low values 
of Bp and high values of α. We present here the proof of this statement (related computer 
simulations can be found in Appendix B).  
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Clearly, a high α (implying a low t*) will make this coefficient approximately equal to (1-Bp).  
That being so, a low Bp implies a high (close to unity) autocorrelation.  If we are prepared to 
assume a large sample, and define t* according to the rejection region (10) for pt: 
 
we can further simplify the OLS parameter using (8). 
α α ≤ − ⇒ ∆ − ≤
*






























With finely graduated time intervals, the inequalities will be approximate equalities, and a low  
Bp and a high α will result in a high OLS coefficient.  Q.E.D. 
 
 
APPENDIX B. EXCHANGE RATE MODEL SIMULATIONS 
 
810 versions of the model were generated with all the combinations of the following 
parameter values for βp, βi and α:  βp = [0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9]; βi = [0.1, 0.2, 
0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9]; α = [0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9]. We then 
ran six sets of regressions for each of this version. Two sets are the uncovered interest rate   25
regressions (equation (1) in the main text), with and without the constant term. The third and 
fourth sets correspond to the term structure regressions (equation (2) in the main text), with 
and without the constant term. The last two sets are interest rate forecasting regressions (under 
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UIP regressions. In the main text, Table 1 considered the UIP regressions with constant, with 
mean slope coefficient values classified by α and βp. Table 8 is also on the UIP regressions. 
We find that the UIP slope coefficient is robustly lower than 1 both in regressions with and 
without slope. It is lower for lower βi and α values and the higher the βi. Overall, the 
downwards bias shows a considerable degree of robustness, especially for realistic values of 
βp (0.1-0.3), equivalent to 75% of the impact on inflation occurring between 1 and 3 years. 
 
TABLE 8 – UNCOVERED INTEREST RATE REGRESSIONS  
A. WITHOUT CONSTANT: MEAN SLOPE COEFFICIENT VALUES CLASSIFIED BY α AND β p 
 
α
βp 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.1 0.091 0.079 0.045 -0.011 -0.093 -0.181 -0.313 -0.402 -0.511 -0.808
(0.074) (0.111) (0.175) (0.246) (0.322) (0.387) (0.467) (0.513) (0.564) (0.681)
0.2 0.188 0.173 0.134 0.072 0.019 -0.06 -0.177 -0.354 -0.62 -0.62
(0.074) (0.093) (0.13) (0.172) (0.201) (0.237) (0.281) (0.333) (0.394) (0.394)
0.3 0.284 0.263 0.211 0.155 0.057 -0.119 -0.119 -0.445 -0.445 -0.445
(0.078) (0.091) (0.117) (0.139) (0.17) (0.21) (0.21) (0.259) (0.259) (0.259)
0.4 0.373 0.352 0.314 0.238 0.078 0.078 -0.28 -0.28 -0.28 -0.28
(0.083) (0.09) (0.101) (0.119) (0.146) (0.146) (0.175) (0.175) (0.175) (0.175)
0.5 0.476 0.449 0.391 0.25 0.25 -0.125 -0.125 -0.125 -0.125 -0.125
(0.084) (0.089) (0.098) (0.112) (0.112) (0.119) (0.119) (0.119) (0.119) (0.119)
0.6 0.572 0.529 0.406 0.406 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.086) (0.09) (0.096) (0.096) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078)
0.7 0.658 0.555 0.555 0.155 0.155 0.155 0.155 0.155 0.155 0.155
(0.089) (0.09) (0.09) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
0.8 0.702 0.702 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28
(0.089) (0.089) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
0.9 0.85 0.395 0.395 0.395 0.395 0.395 0.395 0.395 0.395 0.395




















Notes: The table reports mean slope coefficients (and mean standard errors in parenthesis) across 
simulations with different values of βi.   26
 
B. WITH CONSTANT: MEAN SLOPE COEFFICIENT VALUES CLASSIFIED BY α AND β i 
 
  α
βi 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.1 0.502 0.48 0.442 0.388 0.319 0.242 0.163 0.081 0.018 -0.055
(0.029) (0.041) (0.063) (0.089) (0.116) (0.141) (0.165) (0.186) (0.202) (0.221)
0.2 0.501 0.464 0.411 0.344 0.265 0.181 0.097 0.012 -0.053 -0.127
(0.045) (0.055) (0.075) (0.1) (0.125) (0.149) (0.173) (0.193) (0.21) (0.228)
0.3 0.5 0.447 0.379 0.299 0.21 0.119 0.03 -0.058 -0.124 -0.199
(0.061) (0.068) (0.088) (0.11) (0.134) (0.157) (0.181) (0.201) (0.217) (0.235)
0.4 0.5 0.431 0.348 0.255 0.156 0.058 -0.036 -0.127 -0.195 -0.271
(0.076) (0.082) (0.1) (0.121) (0.144) (0.166) (0.188) (0.209) (0.225) (0.243)
0.5 0.499 0.414 0.316 0.21 0.101 -0.004 -0.102 -0.197 -0.267 -0.343
(0.092) (0.096) (0.112) (0.132) (0.153) (0.174) (0.196) (0.216) (0.232) (0.25)
0.6 0.498 0.398 0.285 0.166 0.047 -0.066 -0.168 -0.266 -0.338 -0.415
(0.108) (0.11) (0.124) (0.142) (0.162) (0.183) (0.204) (0.224) (0.24) (0.258)
0.7 0.497 0.382 0.253 0.122 -0.008 -0.127 -0.235 -0.336 -0.409 -0.487
(0.124) (0.124) (0.136) (0.153) (0.172) (0.191) (0.212) (0.232) (0.247) (0.265)
0.8 0.496 0.365 0.222 0.077 -0.062 -0.189 -0.301 -0.406 -0.48 -0.559
(0.14) (0.138) (0.149) (0.164) (0.181) (0.2) (0.22) (0.239) (0.254) (0.272)
0.9 0.495 0.349 0.19 0.033 -0.117 -0.251 -0.367 -0.475 -0.551 -0.631




















Notes: The table reports mean slope coefficients (and mean standard errors in parenthesis) across 
simulations with different values of βp. 
 
C. WITHOUT CONSTANT: MEAN SLOPE COEFFICIENT VALUES CLASSIFIED BY α AND β i 
 
α
βi 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.1 0.492 0.473 0.442 0.4 0.349 0.293 0.24 0.184 0.146 0.115
(0.025) (0.033) (0.051) (0.071) (0.091) (0.111) (0.13) (0.147) (0.16) (0.173)
0.2 0.486 0.452 0.407 0.354 0.294 0.232 0.175 0.117 0.078 0.046
(0.039) (0.046) (0.061) (0.08) (0.099) (0.118) (0.137) (0.154) (0.166) (0.179)
0.3 0.479 0.431 0.373 0.308 0.239 0.171 0.111 0.05 0.01 -0.022
(0.054) (0.058) (0.072) (0.089) (0.108) (0.126) (0.143) (0.16) (0.173) (0.186)
0.4 0.473 0.41 0.338 0.262 0.184 0.11 0.046 -0.017 -0.058 -0.09
(0.068) (0.071) (0.083) (0.098) (0.116) (0.133) (0.15) (0.167) (0.18) (0.193)
0.5 0.466 0.389 0.303 0.216 0.129 0.049 -0.018 -0.084 -0.126 -0.159
(0.083) (0.084) (0.094) (0.108) (0.124) (0.14) (0.157) (0.174) (0.186) (0.199)
0.6 0.46 0.368 0.269 0.169 0.074 -0.012 -0.083 -0.151 -0.194 -0.227
(0.098) (0.097) (0.105) (0.117) (0.132) (0.148) (0.164) (0.18) (0.193) (0.206)
0.7 0.453 0.347 0.234 0.123 0.019 -0.072 -0.147 -0.218 -0.261 -0.295
(0.112) (0.109) (0.116) (0.127) (0.14) (0.155) (0.171) (0.187) (0.199) (0.212)
0.8 0.447 0.326 0.199 0.077 -0.035 -0.133 -0.212 -0.285 -0.329 -0.364
(0.127) (0.122) (0.127) (0.136) (0.148) (0.162) (0.178) (0.194) (0.206) (0.219)
0.9 0.44 0.305 0.165 0.031 -0.09 -0.194 -0.276 -0.352 -0.397 -0.432





















Notes: The table reports mean slope coefficients (and mean standard errors in parenthesis) across 
simulations with different values of βp.   27
 
Term structure regressions. In the main text, Table 2 considered the term structure 
regressions with constant, with mean slope coefficient values classified by α and βp. Table 9 
is also on the term structure regressions. As predicted by equation (16), the slope coefficient is 
lower with lower βp values, leading to small mean coefficients for βp ≤ 0.3. Slope coefficients 
are very robust to the presence of a constant and to different α values, and entirely invariant to 
changes in βi. 
 
TABLE 9 – TERM STRUCTURE REGRESSIONS  
 
A. WITHOUT CONSTANT: MEAN SLOPE COEFFICIENT VALUES CLASSIFIED BY α AND βp 
 
α
βp 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.1 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.101 0.102 0.103 0.105 0.107 0.110 0.137
(0) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.022)
0.2 0.200 0.200 0.201 0.202 0.204 0.206 0.211 0.222 0.253 0.253
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.016) (0.024) (0.024)
0.3 0.300 0.300 0.302 0.304 0.308 0.319 0.319 0.356 0.356 0.356
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
0.4 0.400 0.401 0.402 0.405 0.414 0.414 0.450 0.450 0.450 0.450
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.011) (0.011) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
0.5 0.500 0.500 0.502 0.508 0.508 0.538 0.538 0.538 0.538 0.538
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
0.6 0.600 0.601 0.604 0.604 0.626 0.626 0.626 0.626 0.626 0.626
(0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
0.7 0.700 0.701 0.701 0.714 0.714 0.714 0.714 0.714 0.714 0.714
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
0.8 0.800 0.800 0.805 0.805 0.805 0.805 0.805 0.805 0.805 0.805
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
0.9 0.900 0.901 0.901 0.901 0.901 0.901 0.901 0.901 0.901 0.901






















Notes: The table reports mean slope coefficients (and mean standard errors in parenthesis) across 
simulations with different values of βi. 
 










Constant 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Yes 0.499 0.498 0.498 0.499 0.501 0.505 0.508 0.512 0.515 0.516
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.01) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014)
No 0.500 0.501 0.502 0.505 0.509 0.514 0.519 0.524 0.528 0.531
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.01) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014)
Notes: The table reports mean slope coefficients (and mean standard errors in parenthesis) across 
simulations with different values of βp and β i . Coefficients and standard errors are invariant to 
different values of β i. 
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Interest forecasting regressions. Tables 10 through 12 consider interest rate forecasting 
equations. They show that, for βp ≤ 0.3 and high values of α, the mean slope coefficient can 
be positive and larger than 0. 
 
TABLE 10 – INTEREST RATE FORECASTING REGRESSIONS WITH CONSTANT: 
MEAN SLOPE COEFFICIENT VALUES CLASSIFIED BY α AND β p 
 
α
βp 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.1 -0.009 -0.057 -0.112 -0.137 -0.119 -0.067 0.045 0.135 0.256 0.627
(0.007) (0.017) (0.029) (0.045) (0.065) (0.083) (0.101) (0.11) (0.115) (0.097)
0.2 -0.012 -0.019 -0.023 -0.008 0.014 0.055 0.128 0.253 0.46 0.46
(0.006) (0.012) (0.025) (0.039) (0.049) (0.06) (0.072) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083)
0.3 -0.005 -0.007 -0.002 0.012 0.047 0.129 0.129 0.31 0.31 0.31
(0.005) (0.011) (0.022) (0.031) (0.044) (0.059) (0.059) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
0.4 -0.003 -0.003 0 0.013 0.057 0.057 0.195 0.195 0.195 0.195
(0.005) (0.009) (0.014) (0.024) (0.039) (0.039) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056)
0.5 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.021 0.021 0.112 0.112 0.112 0.112 0.112
(0.003) (0.006) (0.012) (0.023) (0.023) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
0.6 -0.001 0 0.006 0.006 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056
(0.002) (0.005) (0.012) (0.012) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
0.7 0 0.001 0.001 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023
(0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
0.8 0 0 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
(0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
0.9 0 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001




















Notes: The table reports mean slope coefficients (and mean standard errors in parenthesis) across 
simulations with different values of βi. 
 
TABLE 11 – INTEREST RATE FORECASTING REGRESSIONS WITHOUT CONSTANT: 
MEAN SLOPE COEFFICIENT VALUES CLASSIFIED BY α AND β p 
 
α
βp 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.1 0.001 0.007 0.03 0.071 0.134 0.205 0.313 0.387 0.478 0.729
(0.005) (0.015) (0.029) (0.044) (0.058) (0.069) (0.078) (0.081) (0.082) (0.064)
0.2 0.002 0.006 0.023 0.055 0.086 0.134 0.21 0.328 0.512 0.512
(0.006) (0.012) (0.024) (0.037) (0.045) (0.055) (0.064) (0.072) (0.07) (0.07)
0.3 0.001 0.005 0.02 0.04 0.082 0.168 0.168 0.343 0.343 0.343
(0.005) (0.01) (0.021) (0.03) (0.041) (0.055) (0.055) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064)
0.4 0.001 0.004 0.01 0.028 0.078 0.078 0.216 0.216 0.216 0.216
(0.005) (0.008) (0.014) (0.023) (0.037) (0.037) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053)
0.5 0 0.002 0.008 0.031 0.031 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125
(0.003) (0.006) (0.011) (0.022) (0.022) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
0.6 0 0.002 0.01 0.01 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.064
(0.002) (0.005) (0.012) (0.012) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
0.7 0 0.002 0.002 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027
(0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
0.8 0 0 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
(0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
0.9 0 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
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Notes: The table reports mean slope coefficients (and mean standard errors in parenthesis) across 
simulations with different values of βi. 
 
TABLE 12 – INTEREST RATE FORECASTING REGRESSIONS WITH AND WITHOUT CONSTANT: 
MEAN SLOPE COEFFICIENT VALUES CLASSIFIED BY α AND β i 
 
  α
Constant 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Yes -0.003 -0.01 -0.014 -0.007 0.012 0.041 0.077 0.121 0.158 0.199
(0.003) (0.007) (0.014) (0.022) (0.03) (0.037) (0.043) (0.046) (0.047) (0.045)
No 0.001 0.003 0.012 0.03 0.057 0.09 0.126 0.166 0.197 0.225








Notes: The table reports mean slope coefficients (and mean standard errors in parenthesis) across 
simulations with different values of βp and β i . Coefficients and standard errors are invariant to 
different values of β i. 
 
APPENDIX C. EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Instructions for 0.7 Condition 
 
Welcome to the experiment! 
 
The experiment is divided into two parts, Stage 1 and Stage 2. Your final winnings will be 
equal to the Stage 1 Payment, the Stage 2 Payment and a participation fee of 8 dollars.  (All 
winnings will be rounded to the nearest 5 cents).   
 
You are playing Stage 1 first. You can see two identical urns on the table, and a set of white 
and orange balls in a basket; you can also see a screen. The experimenter will shortly do the 
following: 
(a) show you that the urns are empty; 
(b) take seven white balls and three orange balls, and put them in one of the two urns; let us 
label this urn Urn 1; 
(c) take three white balls and seven orange balls, and put them in the other urn; let us label 
this urn Urn 2; 
(d) hide both urns behind the screen. 
 
There are six periods in Stage 1.  You have received an answer booklet with a sheet for each 
period. 
 
At the start of each period, the experimenter announces the period number and writes it on the 
board. Then one of the two urns will be randomly chosen, by the flip of a coin, independently 
of what urns were chosen in previous periods. You will not be able to see whether this chosen 
urn is Urn 1 or Urn 2, but you will be asked to guess how likely you think it is that the chosen 
urn is Urn 1.  
 
There are sixteen draws in each period. At the start of each draw the experimenter announces 
the draw number and writes it on the board. In Draw 0, which happens at the start of the   30
period, your best probability guess that the chosen urn is Urn 1 would have to be 50%: this is 
because at the start of each period the chosen urn is picked randomly afresh. This Draw 0 
probability guess has been printed into the answer booklet for you. 
 
For Draws 1 through Draw 15 inclusive: 
 
1.  first, the experimenter draws a ball from the chosen urn and announces whether it 
is white or orange; please write the ball colour on the answer sheet, in the line 
corresponding to the correct period and draw; the experimenter then puts the ball 
back into the chosen urn; 
 
2.  second, you have to answer the following question: “how likely is it that the 
chosen urn is Urn 1? (Remember, Urn 1 is the urn with 7 white and 3 orange 
balls). Please choose a probability over the range 0% (definitely not) to 100% 
(definitely certain)”; please put your guess in the line in the answer booklet 
corresponding to the correct period and draw. 
 
At the end of the period the experimenter hides the chosen urn again behind the screen. If you 
are in periods 1 through 5, you should move on to the answer sheet for the following period. 
If you are in period 6, please wait until the sheets are collected and the material for Stage 2 is 
distributed. 
 
Stage 1 Payment. It is important that you try to make your best probability guesses, both 
because it is important for the value of the experiment, and because your final winnings 
depend on it. At the end of the experiment the experimenter will randomly choose a winning 
draw to reward your performance. The experimenter will roll a die to choose the period, and 
pick randomly from a third urn (with balls numbered between 1 through 15) to choose the 
winning draw. Your Stage 1 Payment will depend on your choice in the draw corresponding 
to the number on the ball which has been picked. In relation to this draw, the experimenter 
will take your choice and compare it with the true chosen urn for that draw. If in the winning 
draw the chosen urn was Urn 1, then the correct probability of the chosen urn being Urn 1 is 
100%; if the chosen urn was Urn 2, then the correct probability of the chosen urn being Urn 1 
is  0%. Your Stage 1 Payment will then be equal to  
 
25 – 25 × (guess – correct probability)
2 
 
that is, to 25 dollars minus a penalty. The penalty will be equal to the square of the error, that 
is of difference between the guess and the correct probability, multiplied by 25. The Stage 1 
Payment will be higher the more correct your guess is. The enclosed table provides Stage 1 
Payment values corresponding to some possible error levels. 
 
Please stay seated throughout the experiment. It is essential, for the scientific value of the 
experiment, that you (a) do not communicate in any way with other participants during the 
experiment; (b) do not change your guesses for previous draws. You are liable to be expelled 
from the experiment, and forfeit all winnings (including the participation fee), if you do not 
comply with these simple rules. 
 
This is an individual choice experiment: your choices have no influence on the winnings of 
other participants, and similarly the choices of other participants have no influence on your 
winnings. If you have any question, please raise your hand until an experimenter comes close   31
to you, and then ask with a low voice. This may be a good time to ask questions, but feel free 
to raise your hand to ask questions at any time. 
Stage 1 Payment Table 
 
Payment = 25 – 25 × (guess – correct probability)
2 
 
Error Stage 1 Payment Error Stage 1 Payment Error Stage 1 Payment
0% 25 34% 22.11 68% 13.44
1% 25 35% 21.94 69% 13.1
2% 24.99 36% 21.76 70% 12.75
3% 24.98 37% 21.58 71% 12.4
4% 24.96 38% 21.39 72% 12.04
5% 24.94 39% 21.2 73% 11.68
6% 24.91 40% 21 74% 11.31
7% 24.88 41% 20.8 75% 10.94
8% 24.84 42% 20.59 76% 10.56
9% 24.8 43% 20.38 77% 10.18
10% 24.75 44% 20.16 78% 9.79
11% 24.7 45% 19.94 79% 9.4
12% 24.64 46% 19.71 80% 9
13% 24.58 47% 19.48 81% 8.6
14% 24.51 48% 19.24 82% 8.19
15% 24.44 49% 19 83% 7.78
16% 24.36 50% 18.75 84% 7.36
17% 24.28 51% 18.5 85% 6.94
18% 24.19 52% 18.24 86% 6.51
19% 24.1 53% 17.98 87% 6.08
20% 24 54% 17.71 88% 5.64
21% 23.9 55% 17.44 89% 5.2
22% 23.79 56% 17.16 90% 4.75
23% 23.68 57% 16.88 91% 4.3
24% 23.56 58% 16.59 92% 3.84
25% 23.44 59% 16.3 93% 3.38
26% 23.31 60% 16 94% 2.91
27% 23.18 61% 15.7 95% 2.44
28% 23.04 62% 15.39 96% 1.96
29% 22.9 63% 15.08 97% 1.48
30% 22.75 64% 14.76 98% 0.99
31% 22.6 65% 14.44 99% 0.5
32% 22.44 66% 14.11 100% 0
33% 22.28 67% 13.78
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Answer Booklet: Content of the Sheet for Each Period 
 
When the experimenter draws a ball, write down the colour of the drawn ball in the middle 
column (if you find it convenient, you can just write W for white and O for orange). 
 
How likely is it that the chosen urn is Urn 1? (Remember, Urn 1 is the urn with 7 white and 3 
orange balls). Please choose a probability over the range 0% (definitely not) to 100% 
(definitely certain). Write down your answer in the Probability Guess column. 
 
Do not change probability guesses corresponding to previous draws. If you do, you are liable 
to to be expelled from the experiment, and forfeit all winnings (including the participation 
fee). 
 
If you discover that you have put your guesses in the wrong place (say, the wrong page or 
wrong row), please raise your hand. 
 



















Instructions for 0.6 Condition 
 
These were identical to those for the 0.7 condition, except that ‘six balls’ (‘6 balls’) were 
replaced for ‘seven balls’ (‘7 balls’), and ‘four balls’ (‘4 balls’) for ‘three place’ (‘3 balls’). 
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APPENDIX D. COMPUTATION OF MEAN SUM OF SQUARES ERROR AND ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS 
 
The mean sum of squares error (MSE) is equal to the sum of squares error (SSE) divided by 
the number of relevant datapoints. 
 
D.1 Sign Tests 
 
For the purpose of nonparametric sign tests, an algorithm x fits better than an algorithm y to 
predict the choices by a given experimental participant if she has a lower MSE if we were to 
predict her choices using algorithm x than if we were to predict her choices using algorithm y. 
Therefore we are interested in computing MSE values at the level of each experimental 
participant, i.e. at the level of the goodness of fit of each algorithm for each experimental 
participant.  
 
Define R the number of rounds that are included in the sample for each participant; r = 15 the 
number of rounds in a given period (always 15); q the number of periods that are included in 
the sample for each participant. Clearly, R = rq by definition. There are three procedures to 
compute the MSE at the level of each experimental participant. 
 
MSE by observation. It is possible to compute the mean squared difference by observation 
between prediction and observation. Then, in relation to each participant making a choice 
pi
actual in round i and to each corresponding theoretical prediction pi





















where R = rq: R = 90 for the full sample and for most subjects in the restricted sample (i.e., 
whenever q = 6); R = 75 for the nine subjects with contaminated periods (one each) in the 
restricted sample (i.e., whenever q = 5); R = 60 for the experienced sample and for most 
subjects in the experienced restricted sample (i.e., whenever q = 4); R = 45 for the four 
subjects with contaminated periods (one each) among periods 3-6 in the experienced 
restricted sample (i.e., whenever q = 3). 
 
MSE by observation values provide the natural measure in relation to which to estimate sign 
tests, as in section 5.4.  
 
MSE by period. It is possible to compute the mean squared difference by period between 
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where r = 15 and the value of q depends on the number of periods in the sample: q = 6 in the 
full sample and in most cases in the restricted sample; q  = 5 for the nine subjects with 
contaminated periods (one each) in the restricted sample; q = 4 in the experienced and in most   34
cases in the experienced restricted sample; q = 3 for the four subjects with contaminated 
periods (one each) among periods 3-6 in the experienced restricted sample. 
 
MSE by subject. It is possible to compute for each subject the square of the sum of differences 
between predictions and observations. For the purpose of sign tests where the analysis is at 
the level of goodness of fit at the level of each experimental participant, the MSE by subject 
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where R = rq, with possible values equal to 90, 75, 60 and 45, as specified earlier under the 
description of the MSE by observation algorithm. 
 
D.2 Robustness Tests 
 
In this appendix we run sign tests using MSE values computed by period or by subject rather 
than by observation as in the main text. The results are shown in Table 13. 
(Table 13 appears at the end of the document.) 
IEN and IEC always outperform RE. IEN outperforms IEC in the MSE analysis by period, and 
in two of the four samples in the MSE analysis by subject. 
 
APPENDIX E. TESTS OF ROBUSTNESS OF α ESTIMATES 
 
E.1 Experimental Hypotheses 
 
This appendix discusses two additional hypotheses, designed to test the robustness of IE. The 
first hypothesis is a test of the robustness of α estimates to changes in the task they are 
estimated from. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 3. Mean α values do not significantly differ between the 0.6 and 0.7 conditions. 
 
We also aim to test whether there is some sense in which agents do not converge towards RE 
as the experiment progresses. To test this, we employ the least squares method to estimate α 
values that best fit each period as played by each subject. That is, we consider the 15 choices 
made by a given subject in a given period, and we find the period-specific value of α that 
mimimizes the sum of squared errors between predictions and observations. Thus, for each 
subject there are six period-specific values of α, and one can analyze whether these period-
specific values followed any particular dynamic pattern in the experiment. 
 
HYPOTHESIS  4. Mean period-specific α values tend to converge to 1 as the experiment 
progresses and the subjects have opportunities to learn about the nature of the task. 
 
With Hypothesis 4, we aim to verify the absence of any obvious convergence towards greater 
RE play (i.e., IE with α = 1) across the 90 rounds of the experiment. 
   35
E.2 Experimental Results 
 
Hypothesis 3. As shown by Table 3 in the main text, mean α values are surprisingly stable 
between the two conditions. While the size of the difference changes depending on the sample 
and IE measure used, Hypothesis 3 can never be rejected (at P < 0.1 or better) in Mann-
Whitney tests. The greatest variability occurs for the full sample and for the restricted sample 
in relation to IEN. In all other cases mean α values are within at most 0.06 of one another. 
 
Hypothesis 4. The fact that the evidence for the other hypotheses is robust to the removal of 
the first two periods, as in the experienced sample, already suggests that IE may not tend to 
converge to RE as experience grows. 
 




Figure 5 shows the absence of any convergence to RE across the ninety rounds of the 
experiment. Spearman correlation coefficients between mean α values and period number are 
not statistically significant (and are within 0.025 of 0) for all samples and both for IEC and 
IEN.   36
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Full Sample Experienced Sample
x y MSE(x)<MSE(y) MSE(x)=MSE(y) MSE(x)>MSE(y) 2-tail P MSE(x)<MSE(y) MSE(x)=MSE(y) MSE(x)>MSE(y) 2-tail P
IEC IEN 1 23 13 0.002 2 22 13 0.007
IEC RE 11 26 0 0.001 14 23 0 0
IEN RE 23 14 0 0 24 13 0 0
Restricted Sample Restricted Experienced Sample
x y MSE(x)<MSE(y) MSE(x)=MSE(y) MSE(x)>MSE(y) 2-tail P MSE(x)<MSE(y) MSE(x)=MSE(y) MSE(x)>MSE(y) 2-tail P
IEC IEN 1 23 13 0.002 0 23 14 0
IEC RE 11 26 0 0.001 13 22 2 0.007
IEN RE 23 14 0 0 24 13 0 0
Notes: Each cell value indicates the number of subjects for which, in relation to any two algorithms x and y (and a given sample), MSE(x) < MSE(y), or 
MSE(x) = MSE(y), or  MSE(x) > MSE(y), where MSE is the mean sum of squares error by observation: see Appendix C. P values are approximated to three 
decimal places. 
 TABLE 13 - FURTHER SIGN TESTS OF THE GOODNESS OF FIT OF EXPECTATIONAL MODELS 










Full Sample Experienced Sample
x y MSE(x)<MSE(y) MSE(x)=MSE(y) MSE(x)>MSE(y) 2-tail P MSE(x)<MSE(y) MSE(x)=MSE(y) MSE(x)>MSE(y) 2-tail P
IEC IEN 1 23 13 0.002 1 14 22 0.001
IEC RE 11 26 0 0.001 12 23 2 0.013
IEN RE 23 14 0 0 24 13 0 0
Restricted Sample Restricted Experienced Sample
x y MSE(x)<MSE(y) MSE(x)=MSE(y) MSE(x)>MSE(y) 2-tail P MSE(x)<MSE(y) MSE(x)=MSE(y) MSE(x)>MSE(y) 2-tail P
IEC IEN 1 23 13 0.002 1 14 22 0.001
IEC RE 11 26 0 0.001 12 23 2 0.013
IEN RE 23 14 0 0 24 13 0 0
Notes: MSE: mean sum of squares error by period. P values are approximated to three decimal places. 
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B. TESTS FOR MSE BY SUBJECT 
 
  Full Sample Experienced Sample
x y MSE(x)<MSE(y) MSE(x)=MSE(y) MSE(x)>MSE(y) 2-tail P MSE(x)<MSE(y) MSE(x)=MSE(y) MSE(x)>MSE(y) 2-tail P
IEC IEN 7 23 7 1 2 22 13 0.007
IEC RE 10 26 1 0.012 11 23 3 0.057
IEN RE 17 14 6 0.035 20 13 4 0.002
Restricted Sample Restricted Experienced Sample
x y MSE(x)<MSE(y) MSE(x)=MSE(y) MSE(x)>MSE(y) 2-tail P MSE(x)<MSE(y) MSE(x)=MSE(y) MSE(x)>MSE(y) 2-tail P
IEC IEN 7 23 7 1 2 22 13 0.007
IEC RE 10 26 1 0.012 11 23 3 0.057









MSE: mean sum of squares error by subject. P values are approximated to three decimal places. 
 
 
 